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Abstract: 
What are the conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to 
social spending?  More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government 
condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? We 
demonstrate that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state 
retrenchment. Our findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in 
periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under 
left-wing governments. (ii) Since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, 
it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition 
government. Therefore, we show that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing 
broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run 
multipliers from autoregressive distribute lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982-
2009 period, we find substantial support for our expectations. 
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1 Introduction  
Since the 1980s, austerity has been the dominant topic in the debate on fiscal policies in 
democratic OECD-nations. Austerity policies are aimed at fiscal consolidation either by 
cutting public expenditure or raising taxes. Usually both elements are implemented 
simultaneously with an emphasis on spending cuts that target several policy fields. Yet given 
its sheer size in public budgets, the welfare state can hardly be spared. What are the 
conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to social spending? 
We combine two main arguments. First, left parties are viewed as trustworthy 
advocates of the welfare state that would not slash it for narrow ideological reasons, but 
instead, choose to remodel it in order to keep it sustainable in the long run (see e.g. Ross, 
2000). As a result, left-wing governments may be best able to reduce social spending in 
periods of fiscal consolidation. 
The second argument concerns the type of government and the requirement of stable 
majorities necessary for big reforms, as well as the accompanying electoral risks (Pierson, 
1994). The larger a pro-reform coalition, the more likely will adjustment burdens be balanced 
across electoral groups, and the less likely will a strong parliamentary or extra-parliamentary 
opposition be present and able to exploit the electoral vulnerability of the governing parties 
implementing a consolidation. The resulting reform package is therefore more time-consistent 
and unlikely to be repealed after the next election. This applies to surplus coalitions, but also 
to minority governments that have to build large policy-field specific parliamentary majorities 
(Lijphart, 2012: 79-93).  
Given these two arguments, we expect the strongest reductions in social spending 
during fiscal consolidation to be implemented under broad coalition governments with a 
substantial participation of left-wing parties.  
Our hypothesis is in contrast to extant and most recent research. Both Jensen and 
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Mortensen (2014) and Hübscher (2015) show that right parties slash the welfare state most—
all other things being equal. According to these authors the logic of political competition 
between left and right produces generally the same substantive outcomes before and during 
austerity. We challenge this standard argument by using a new data set on austerity, which is 
hardly analysed in social sciences research (with the exception of Hübscher (2015) and 
Hübscher and Sattler (2014)), and by estimating a more appropriate model: an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) general dynamic model without the invalid restrictive specifications 
often found in standard time series cross-sectional analyses (De Boef & Keele, 2008). 
Even more importantly, we build on established findings of the literature on consensus 
democracies (Lijphart, 2012: 79-93), on most recent insights about the reform capacity of 
large coalitions (Alexiadou, 2013) and about the preconditions for policy reform that produce 
stable and sustainable outcomes in the interest of the common good (Jacobs, 2011). Our 
article adds to existing evidence that large coalitions are better able to enact policy change 
than single party governments.  
We compile a dataset to compare the experiences with austerity policies in 17 OECD 
countries during the 1982 to 2009 period. Below, we develop our theoretical argument on the 
conditions under which partisanship and policy coalitions influence fiscal adjustment 
programs on social spending. Next, we discuss the operationalization of our core variables, in 
particular the major independent variable of fiscal adjustment, which is taken from an action-
based dataset of fiscal consolidations by Devries et al. (2011). We then discuss our research 
design and the statistical technique; finally, we present our empirical findings. 
2 The argument 
In the summer of 1982, the socialist French President Francois Mitterrand learned the hard 
way, that under severe constraints of liberalized markets for goods and capital, traditional 
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Keynesian policies were no longer viable. Reluctantly, the French government implemented 
austerity policies (Hall, 1986, Chapter 8), marking the beginning of the ‘permanent austerity’ 
period in the mature democracies of the Western world (Pierson, 2001). ‘Permanent austerity’ 
means that austerity is the dominant topic in the discourse of governing parties. Despite that 
basic conviction that public deficits must be reduced, public households may still expand due, 
for example, to demographic or economic reasons such as during the first years of the ‘Great 
Recession’, that started in 2008 (Armingeon, 2012; Cameron, 2012). By 2010, full-blown 
austerity measures were not only back on governments’ agendas (except in Japan, Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden), but they had returned with a force not witnessed in earlier decades. 
It is against this background that we study the impact of austerity policies on the 
welfare state. Austerity may come in many different forms. Some governments try to 
consolidate public finances with higher taxes, others focus on cuts in spending, and, probably 
most frequently, governments opt for a mixture of spending cuts and tax increases (see Von 
Hagen and Strauch (2001), Tavares (2004), and Mulas-Granados (2006) for economic 
literature on the composition of fiscal adjustments that partly also finds partisan effects). 
Spending cuts can be directed towards many policy fields, ranging from reducing subsidies in 
agriculture, education and military departments, to the overall costs of public administration. 
One of the most important candidates for cuts, however, is the welfare state. In 2009, public 
outlays accounted for 49% of GDP on average in the 23 mature OECD democracies, and 
about half of these (25% of GDP) were devoted to the welfare state (calculated from 
Armingeon et al. (2014)). Therefore, any austerity program is likely to include at least some 
cuts in welfare state spending. 
But which political parties will design a program of fiscal consolidation that most 
likely focuses on welfare state retrenchment? In a functionalist perspective (see for example 
Wilensky, 1975) we would expect no correlation at all. The partisan makeup of the 
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government may not matter if the pressure exerted by international markets or supranational 
organizations, such as the EU or the IMF commands austerity, because welfare state cutbacks 
would then be depicted as natural components in the consolidation of strained fiscal resources. 
Yet, this argument is blind against the options and electoral calculus of political parties. 
A basic argument of the power-resources and partisan theory of welfare state 
development (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hibbs, 1977; Hicks & Swank, 1992; Korpi, 1983; 
Korpi & Palme, 2003; Schmidt, 2010) states that left parties (and with some qualifications 
Christian democratic parties) are the strongest supporters of the welfare state—well aligned 
with the interest of their voters (historically from the lower strata of society) in a redistributive 
safety net. From this perspective, left parties should be most reluctant to pursue austerity 
policies that imply welfare retrenchment. Liberal and conservative parties, in contrast, have 
tended to oppose the development and expansion of the welfare state from its emergence, and 
may, therefore, be more inclined to use the opportunity to decrease social spending. In their 
analyses of austerity policies, Hübscher (2015) and Jensen and Mortensen (2014) recently 
provided empirical support for this hypothesis.  
These traditional partisan effects may well have dwindled in the era of globalization 
and austerity (see e.g. Huber & Stephens, 2001). In fact, the direction of partisan influence 
could have gone into reverse, now being driven by the logic of welfare state retrenchment, 
which is very different to the logic of welfare state growth. During its expansion, the welfare 
state has built its own battalions. Largely irrespective of their ideological orientations, the 
overwhelming majority of citizens support the welfare state to which they have contributed in 
the past and from which they expect returns in the future. In consequence, the politics of 
welfare retrenchment is the politics of blame avoidance (Pierson, 1994). For a number of 
reasons left parties may be particularly well suited to retrench the welfare state. For example, 
a left-wing government does not tend to provoke suspicions that it slashes the welfare state on 
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narrow ideological grounds, but can build on its reputation as a defender of the welfare state 
even as it implements cutbacks. This is the so-called ‘Nixon goes to China’-effect (see Green-
Pedersen (2002), Kitschelt (2001). Indeed the politics of the ‘new’ welfare state may be 
substantially different from the welfare state’s four decades after WWII (Bonoli & Natali, 
2013). Therefore we expect that in times of fiscal consolidation, left-wing governments are 
more likely to pursue rigorous cuts to welfare state spending than their right-wing 
counterparts.1  
Our second argument concerns the type of government. Which one will be best 
prepared to engage in welfare state retrenchment? Theories of veto players give a clear 
answer: The odds should be best for centralized one-party governments that are supported by 
a majority of seats in parliament (see for example Tsebelis, 2002). They do not have to make 
compromises with coalition partners watering down the austerity plans. They have the 
necessary majority to pursue a consistent and encompassing policy package. In addition, they 
can design policies in such a way that the clientele of the opposition mainly bears the costs of 
the policy. The odds should be second best for minimal winning governments, which include 
only as many parties as necessary for a parliamentary majority. The odds should be worst for 
minority governments, which need to build ad hoc coalitions for policies, as well as for 
oversized coalition governments. Both of these latter forms of government will have to make 
concessions to other parties, and will have a hard time designing policies that externalize costs 
to the remaining actors—since most of them are formally (oversized coalition) or informally 
(minority government) integrated into the government.  
What seems to be weakness at first sight, however, could turn out to be strength. In his 
analyses of consensus democracies, Arend Lijphart demonstrates that these types of 
                                                        
1 Häusermann et al. (2013) nuanced this argument by pointing at the context of electoral institutions, the type of 
voter-party linkage and general electoral change. However, as a base line, left parties at least did promote the 
Western welfare state, and we have little reason to assume that they changed as much as to become fierce critics 
of their own historical project. 
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democracies, which typically feature oversized coalitions or minority governments, achieve 
rather favourable and sustainable policy outcomes in processes of negotiation and 
compromise (Lijphart, 2008, 2012). Majoritarian democracies, in contrast, which typically 
feature one-party governments or minimal winning coalitions, are prone to ‘zick-zack-policies’ 
dictated by electoral cycles and short-term achievements, which tend to be undone by 
incoming new administrations. If a government intends to govern for the long-term (Jacobs, 
2011), however, it makes sense to include all the relevant actors in a reform coalition, to build 
a consensus and generate trust that costs are shared equally by all actors, and to beware of 
aggressive cost-externalization. This makes it feasible to invest in the long-term, making 
compromises and sacrifices in order to facilitate a sound fiscal position and a sustainable 
welfare state in the future, and to steer clear of short-sighted populist initiatives for immediate 
but short-lived political gain (see also the argument about cooperative veto-points by 
Birchfeld & Crepaz, 1998; Crepaz, 1996; Crepaz, 1998). A major advantage of this approach 
is the reduction of the electoral costs of austerity and social security cutbacks. By definition, 
only few actors are excluded from a broad coalition. In consequence, there are only few actors 
available outside the coalition, which could organize a powerful opposition to, and launch a 
potent electoral campaign against the government implementing unpopular reforms and 
cutbacks. Alexiadou (2013) provides strong empirical evidence for such counter-intuitive 
effects of broad coalitions. Bonoli (2000) finds similar results for pension reforms.  
Our central argument about the type of government should not be confused with the 
argument of blame avoidance by obfuscation. Jensen and Mortensen (2014) show that welfare 
state retrenchment is facilitated by a large number of veto points (institutional fragmentation), 
since under these conditions blame attribution is difficult. While these authors explicitly 
exclude the type of government, we consider it to be a major explanatory variable for 
retrenchment. In other words, we emphasize a causal chain that works through the rational 
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strategy of political actors to minimize opposition by inclusion, and the mutual and balanced 
compensation of electoral constituencies. Jensen and Mortensen (2014), in contrast, point to 
the logic of blame avoidance by obfuscation, which constitutes a second causal chain that may 
certainly also be at work. 
Our arguments about the impact of the partisan complexion and the type of 
government on welfare state retrenchment in times of austerity can be condensed into the 
following hypothesis: 
Fiscal consolidation programs implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments 
are associated with relatively large reductions in public social expenditures. 
All other things equal, both the presence of a left-wing government or that of a broad 
governing coalition should by itself tend to foster welfare state retrenchment in periods of 
fiscal consolidation. We therefore expect the strongest reduction in public social spending to 
occur if both conditions are met simultaneously. Alternatively, fiscal adjustments 
implemented by non-left narrow coalition governments should be least likely to lead to a 
substantial trimming of the social safety net. 
Moreover, at the beginning of this section we have emphasized the substantial relative 
weight of welfare-related items in public budgets. As a result of this weight, the degree of 
welfare state retrenchment should be associated with the size of a fiscal consolidation package. 
While a relatively minor adjustment may be realized without touching social security, any big 
program can hardly shun social policies. By implication, relatively large austerity programs in 
particular should be associated with decreasing public social expenditures. In addition to that, 
also the magnitude of both our partisan and our government type effect may be affected by 
the size of an austerity program: they are likely to be more pronounced when a fiscal 
consolidation is particularly large. In addition to our major hypothesis, we will therefore 
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examine the implicit assumption that both (a) the main effect of a consolidation on the welfare 
state, and (b) the conditional impact of parties and the type of government on this relationship, 
are more pronounced in the context of relatively large austerity programs. 
3 Data and Operationalization  
The focus of this paper is on the degree to which fiscal consolidation implies welfare state 
retrenchment. In other words, is the welfare state—conditioned by the partisan complexion 
and/or the type of government—at the core of policies intended to reduce budget deficits and 
debts? 
Against this background, it becomes apparent why we conceptualize welfare state 
retrenchment exclusively in quantitative budgetary terms. We treat the welfare state simply as 
one of the most important spending categories of government budgets—and for its 
redistributive function the size of this category tends to be strongly associated with income 
inequality. The welfare state’s more qualitative features, such as its institutional structure, its 
program coverage, or generosity, are not at the core of this paper. Therefore, we do not 
analyse the extent to which fiscal adjustments imply a rebalancing of the welfare state, such 
as, for instance, a stronger emphasis on family or active labour market policies at the expense 
of pension or health policies.  
Our dependent variable is operationalized as the annual change (first differences2) in 
total public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as provided by the OECD.3 The use 
of change rates (as opposed to levels) is, from a theoretical point of view, implied by our 
                                                        
2 Operationalizing the change rate as percentage changes does not alter our substantive results. 
3 To measure social expenditure as a share of GDP is conceptually superior over measuring it as a share of total 
public spending. Imagine a country implementing a uniform 10% cut to all spending categories (that is, both 
welfare- and non-welfare-related budget items are equally hit). The net effect of fiscal adjustment on social 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure would then, misleadingly, be zero. Further research could 
analyse whether these welfare state effects of fiscal consolidation vary by field of social policy, such as pension 
policy or unemployment insurances (see Wenzelburger, 2014). 
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research question: we wish to know what changes during and after fiscal adjustment—the size 
of the welfare state per se (as measured by levels of public social expenditures) is not of much 
relevance to us. A methodological justification for this operationalization is provided 
below. OECD public social expenditure data is available from 1980 onwards. Since we are 
using first differences and including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in our statistical 
models, our observation period begins in 1982 (1991 for Austria).  
Our main independent variable is the occurrence of fiscal consolidation, but we also 
distinguish between different sizes of consolidations. The standard approach in comparative 
political economy to operationalize fiscal consolidation starts from changes in countries’ 
primary budget balance (Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008b, 2012) or its cyclically adjusted 
version (CAPB) (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009). A noticeable improvement in this balance (i.e., a 
sharp reduction in budget deficits) indicates fiscal adjustment (FA). For example, Alesina and 
Ardagna (2009, p. 41) code a year as one of FA if the budget balance improves by at least 1.5 
percentage points of GDP. More recently, however, the literature on the topic has become 
sceptical about the validity of this operationalization of FA based on the primary balance or 
CAPB (IMF, 2010, p. 96; Wenzelburger, 2009). 
These indicators measure the outcome of consolidations, instead of looking at 
consolidation policies—which are at the core of our theoretical interest here, and may or may 
not have caused measured outcomes. The CAPB is seen as a remedy to capture discretionary 
policy changes by adjusting primary balances for the effects of the business cycle. The 
methods to correct for cyclical changes, however, are usually inconsistent across different 
data sources and suffer from “measurement errors that are likely to be correlated with 
economic developments” (IMF, 2010, p. 96). And even if an exact cyclical correction were 
possible, the political motivations behind the resulting figures would still be disregarded. To 
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sum up, the overall validity of such outcome-based indicators of fiscal adjustment policies is 
questionable. 
Therefore, a different approach aims at explicitly identifying tax hikes and spending 
cuts passed by political actors at the general government level. This so-called historical or 
action-based approach underlies the work by Devries et al. (2011), who collected a dataset of 
policy measures (i.e., this is no data on budget balances/deficits) motivated explicitly by fiscal 
consolidation (rather than by restraining aggregate demand during periods of strong growth, 
for instance) in 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2009.4 With respect to our sample and 
observation period, the authors identify a total of 159 country-years of FA based on policy 
documents like central bank reports, budget speeches, OECD, IMF, and EU sources, and 
provide estimates of the budgetary impact of these measures in percent of the GDP.5 Note that 
these measures were not only planned, but actually taken by governments; only their 
budgetary impact is based on estimates. 
We construct binary variables indicating FA episodes. The continuous variable—
based on the size of adjustment in percentage of GDP—is censored in the sense that it does 
not properly distinguish between ‘no-FA-cases’ and FA of zero or very small size. Therefore, 
in order to distinguish between ‘no-FA-cases’ on the one hand, and those of different sizes on 
the other, the data enters our statistical analyses in one of two ways: a general FA dummy 
variable that equals 1 for all 159 FA cases in the sample and 0 otherwise, and a dummy 
variable to identify large fiscal adjustments.6 In line with the most commonly used threshold 
                                                        
4 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
5 In 19 of these cases, spending cuts were partly offset by tax cuts, or tax increases were partly offset by 
spending increases. In addition, the expiration of temporary fiscal adjustment measures resulted in negative FA 
sizes in eight instances (Devries et al. 2011: 6). 
6 The ‘negative FA sizes’ resulting from the expiration of temporary measures as discussed in the previous 
footnote are coded as zero FA size (all results are robust, however, if we exclude temporary measures and only 
include permanent ones). Note that our action-based data only covers fiscal consolidations, not fiscal expansions. 
Indeed, the overall fiscal stance of the government as measured based on budget balances, and which also 
underlies the traditional outcome-based approach to operationalizing fiscal consolidations, could be neutral or 
even expansionary during a consolidation as identified in the action-based approach.  
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in economic research (see Alesina & Ardagna, 2009; IMF, 2012, p. 53; Wagschal & 
Wenzelburger, 2008a) consolidations exceeding 1.5% of GDP qualify as ‘large’. Using 
continuous versions of these dummy variables7 does not, however, alter our findings. We 
restrict our analysis to the set of countries and time periods covered by the Devries-data set. 
Table 1 provides an overview of all fiscal adjustment cases in our sample.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The other major independent variables are the partisan complexion of governments and the 
breadth of the policy coalition. Both are operationalized as binary variables based on data 
from Armingeon et al. (2014). With respect to government partisanship, we use data for the 
percentage of cabinet posts occupied by left-wing parties. A dummy variable is coded 1 if left 
parties held more than 50% of cabinet posts in a given country-year. While cabinet shares do 
not always exactly reflect the real distribution of power within governments, our dummy 
indicating an absolute majority is likely to indicate a government dominated by left ideology. 
Moreover, around 63% of all governments in our sample have a left party cabinet share of 
either 100% or 0%. Adjusting the dummy variables so that exactly 50% of cabinet posts also 
indicate left-wing governments or using the continuous version of the variable, does not alter 
our findings.8 
The breadth of the policy coalition is operationalized as a dummy variable based on 
the type of government. If a government is a surplus coalition in the sense that it has more 
parties than needed for a parliamentary majority, it is classified as a ‘broad’ coalition (dummy 
                                                        
7 In its original form, our continuous FA variable varies between -0.75 and 4.74. Derived from this is the 
continuous ‘large FA’ variable, set to zero whenever FA was smaller or equal to 1.5% of GDP (also see IMF 
(2012, p. 50 ff.) for this operationalization). 
8 Our overarching empirical strategy builds on comparing different groups of governments, distinguished by 
their partisan complexion and coalition breath. This is why we prefer to operationalize all our major independent 
variables of interest as binary variables. Nevertheless, operationalizing the partisan complexion of government as 
a continuous variable (i.e. the cabinet shares), only strengthens our results.  
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= 1). Likewise, minority governments usually negotiate policy-specific majorities—they 
would otherwise not be able to shape the legislative process—and are thus also classified as 
broad coalitions. Single party or minimal winning coalition governments, in contrast, are 
classified as ‘narrow’ coalitions (dummy = 0). Our results are robust to alternative 
operationalizations based on a certain threshold of parliamentary seat shares as a necessary 
condition to classify a government as ‘broad’ coalition.9 
In order to examine the effects of the partisan complexion and the type of government 
on the relationship between austerity and social expenditures, we construct interaction terms 
between each of our two FA variables on the one hand, and the partisanship dummy as well as 
the coalition breadth dummy on the other. Finally, we construct dummy variables integrating 
our three major independent variables into four groups against the reference group of ‘no-FA-
cases’. These four group-dummy variables indicate FA (or large FA) cases under (1) left-wing 
broad coalition governments, (2) left-wing narrow coalition/single party governments, (3) 
non-left broad coalition governments, and (4) non-left narrow coalition/single party 
governments. Figure 1 shows the descriptive relationship between these four types of 
government and the average changes in social expenditures. We use the total change of the 
current and the subsequent years since we are interested in long-run effects (see below). In 
line with our hypothesis, fiscal adjustments under left-wing broad coalition governments are 
negatively associated with social expenditure changes. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Our control variables include standard economic factors such as economic growth (data from 
                                                        
9 In this operationalization, ‘broad’ coalitions are governments that are not single-party majority governments 
and that simultaneously have a seat share in parliament of at least 60 or 70%. Minority governments also count 
as ‘broad’. Among others, this operationalization ensures that ‘grand coalitions’ such as the coalition Austria in 
2009 are treated as ‘broad’ as well. 
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OECD, 2012), annual changes in unemployment rates (OECD, 2010b), and economic 
openness (Heston et al., 2012). In the short-run, as automatic stabilizers begin to work, poor 
economic performance leads to higher social expenditures. In the long-run, lower 
performance is expected to decrease the potential for social spending and can thus be 
perceived as an indicator for (higher) problem pressure. We control for additional driving 
forces of social expenditure as identified in the literature (see Kittel & Obinger, 2003). First, 
we include the lagged level of social expenditures in order to account for catch-up and ceiling 
effects. The second is the share of elderly people in the population (data from OECD, 2010b). 
The third is a measure for the funding structure of the welfare state, constructed as social 
security contributions divided by total tax revenues (OECD, 2010a). This contrasts tax-based 
versus insurance-based welfare regimes, where the former is expected to be affected more 
directly when governments consolidate (see Kittel & Obinger, 2003, p. 31). Finally, we 
control for institutional arrangements by including the Rae index of legislative 
fractionalization of the party system (data from Armingeon et al., 2014). 
Details on the operationalization and sources of all variables, as well as summary 
statistics, are found in the online appendix. 
4 Method  
We compile a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset comprising of 466 country-year 
observations between 1982 and 2009. The data is balanced except for the missing data on 
Austria. 
As discussed above, we have theoretical reasons to operationalize our dependent 
variable as first differences. There is, however, also a purely methodological justification for 
this approach. First, when specifying the dependent variable in levels, our data suffers from 
unit heterogeneity—a problem that is commonly solved by adding unit dummies to the model, 
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i.e., fixed-effects estimation. Second, the level-version of the dependent variable has a unit 
root (and therefore is non-stationary), as was indicated by a battery of augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests for panel datasets. A solution that often solves both problems simultaneously is to 
run the regression using first-differences, a strategy we therefore apply for methodological 
reasons as well.10 
Most of our control variables also enter the analysis in first differences. We stick to 
levels, however, whenever it made sense theoretically and when the level variable turned out 
to have more explanatory power than the corresponding operationalization in changes.  
A common downside of a model specification in first differences is the implicit 
assumption about the temporal effect of a change in x on y—i.e., that a change in x causes a 
change in y only once (instantaneously or with a constant lag) and then fades immediately. 
This usually prevents the researcher to draw inferences about the long-term consequences of 
policy changes that are central to much of the research in comparative political economy.  
We mitigate this problem by estimating a distributed lag model where we include our 
FA variables not only at t, but also with a one-year as well as a two-year lag (t-1 and t-2). 
With respect to the lag structure of the control variables, we follow the recommendation by 
De Boef and Keele (2008) and start with a general model (i.e., include contemporaneous 
variables as well as their lags) and impose restrictions only when empirically justified—i.e., 
when the respective variable did not have any substantial explanatory power.11  
We include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to address serial correlation. As there 
still is autocorrelation and panel heteroskedasticity, as well as cross-sectional dependence, 
                                                        
10 An alternative specification commonly used in the context of non-stationary data in time-series- and TSCS-
analysis—estimation based on an error correction model (ECM)—is not possible with our data since the crucial 
assumptions behind this method do not hold: neither are the time-series in question both stationary, nor are they 
co-integrated (and thus both have unit roots) (De Boef & Keele, 2008). Rather, our dependent variable (in levels) 
has a unit-root, while our main independent variables of interest are stationary.  
11 We settled on a maximum lag length of two years for all explanatory variables, partly because we did not find 
any significant effect afterwards (for the FA variables), partly to keep the model as parsimonious as possible (for 
the controls). 
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present in our data, we include country and year fixed effects and apply OLS estimators with 
panel-corrected standard errors.12 In a first step, we thus estimate autoregressive distributed 
lag (ADL) models, formally specified as 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=0
                                    (1) 
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑘(𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝑍)𝑖𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=0
+ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑗𝑘
2
𝑘=0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡−𝑘
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the change in total public social expenditures in country i from time t-1 
to t, 𝛼0  is the constant, and 𝛼1  is the coefficient of the LDV. 𝑍  stands for the dummy 
indicating the partisan composition of government, or the breadth of the policy coalition, 
respectively—that is, in a first step, we estimate partisan and coalition effects separately in 
two series of models. 𝛽𝑘, 𝛾𝑘, and 𝛿𝑘 are three coefficients each (i.e. at t, t-1, and t-2) for the 
relevant FA dummy (FA or FA large), the partisan/coalition dummy, respectively, and the 
FA*partisan/coalition interaction term. Moreover, 𝜁𝑗𝑘  are coefficients for our seven control 
variables at a maximum of three time points each. Finally, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. In 
a second step, equation (1) is slightly altered as we include four indirect interaction terms 
comprising the dummy variables for the four sub-groups of FA cases by partisan complexion 
(left and non-left) and coalition type of governments (broad and narrow) as the main 
parameter terms. 
Our theoretical interest clearly is in the more long-run aggregate impact of fiscal 
adjustment on change rates in social expenditures. In the empirical analysis, we therefore 
proceed by calculating this long-run effect (known as the long-run multiplier (LRM) in the 
                                                        
12 Serial correlation was detected with Wooldridge tests for autocorrelation. Hausman tests, joint F-tests and 
Pesaran tests for cross-sectional dependence indicate significant differences across units (panel effects). 
Modified Wald tests show the presence of panel heteroskedasticity. All tests are significant at the 99% level. 
Finally, we have no indications for severe problems with multicollinearity: the highest average VIF in any of our 
models is 4.02. All analyses were run in Stata 13. 
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time-series literature) of fiscal adjustment from the coefficients of our contemporaneous and 
lagged FA variables as well as from the relevant partisanship or coalition interaction terms. 
Substantively, the resulting battery of LRMs (for both of our FA variables under 
different government ideology or coalition breadth) gives the total effect of fiscal adjustment 
on change rates in social expenditures over a period of 3 years—i.e., the immediate effect 
(impact multiplier) plus the effect that occurs with a one and two year lag.  
Slightly adjusted to the context of our analysis, the formula for calculating the LRM of 
the FA variable in the ADL model of equation (1) is given as 𝐿𝑅𝑀0 = 𝜂0 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2)/
(1 − 𝛼1) when the partisan/coalition dummy equals zero, and as 𝐿𝑅𝑀1 = 𝜂1 = (𝛿1 + 𝛿2 +
𝛿3)/(1 − 𝛼1) when it equals one (i.e. the LRM of the interaction term) (De Boef & Keele, 
2008). In order to obtain the standard error for these LRMs, we follow the procedure 
described by Wooldridge (2013, pp. 134-135).13 That is, we solve the LRM formulas for 𝛽0 
and 𝛿0  to obtain 𝛽0 = 𝜂0(1 − 𝛼1) − 𝛽1 − 𝛽2  and 𝛿0 = 𝜂1(1 − 𝛼1) − 𝛿1 − 𝛿2  and substitute 
that for 𝛽0  and 𝛿0  in equation (1), which leads to equation (2). Finally, equation (2) is 
estimated with the estimate for 𝛼1 being obtained from equation (1) in advance. 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂0(1 − 𝛼1)𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − 𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡)
2
𝑘=1
                             
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=0
+ 𝜂1(1 − 𝛼1)(𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝑍)𝑖𝑡                                   (2) 
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑘((𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝑍)𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − (𝐹𝐴 ∗ 𝑍)𝑖𝑡)
2
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑗𝑘
2
𝑘=0
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡−𝑘
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡         
 
                                                        
13  As an alternative method to calculate the standard errors of the LRMs, we employed the Bewley 
transformation (De Boef & Keele, 2008, p. 192). This yielded slightly smaller standard errors, but we report only 
the more conservative estimated in this analysis. 
 
17 
 
5 Empirical Findings  
Table 2 shows the results of our main regression analyses.14 Models 1 through 4 estimate the 
effects based on all fiscal adjustment (FA) cases on changes in public social spending, while 
models 5 through 8 estimate those based only on large FA cases (FA size larger than 1.5% of 
GDP). For both operationalizations, the first model of each group shows the unconditional 
effects; the second and third show the interaction effects of FA and government 
ideology/coalition breadth; and the fourth model estimates the effects of FA under the four 
categories of governments against the reference group of cases where no FA took place. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
As indicated by the coefficients for the LRM in models 1 and 5, fiscal consolidation is 
associated with shrinking public social expenditures over a period of three years at least (i.e., 
an immediate effect plus effects with a one-year and a two-year lag). Yet, this average effect 
is only significant for large FA. In total, during the period when a large fiscal consolidation 
program was enacted, the change rate of public social expenditures is reduced by 0.49 
percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the immediate positive effect 
that a 5.7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate has on social expenditures 
(likely due to the associated increase in expenditures on unemployment benefits). The general 
pattern is that the coefficients estimated based on large FA cases (models 5-8) strongly 
amplify the negative effect on social expenditure changes found when all—both small and 
large—fiscal adjustments are taken into consideration (models 1-4).15 
                                                        
14 We do not discuss the coefficients of the control variables, which confirm our theoretical expectations. For 
results of robustness tests and concerns with regard to endogeneity see the online appendix. 
15 We are not formally testing the effect of the size of FA in our models by way of three-way interactions, as 
these are difficult to implement technically for distributed lag models and drastically reduce the number of cases 
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These aggregate effects, however, mask some substantial variation in the impact of 
political factors on the degree of welfare state retrenchment. The significant interaction terms 
in models 2 and 6 show that in times of austerity, retrenchment is more pronounced under left 
governments than under non-left ones. Likewise, fiscal consolidations pursued by broad 
coalition governments tend to place more emphasis on trimming the social safety net than 
narrow coalitions do, as is indicated by the interaction terms in models 3 and 7. Some 
uncertainty remains with respect to both of these effects, however, since their statistical 
significance often turns out to be sensitive to sample modifications.16  
While we cannot eliminate this uncertainty altogether, we try to mitigate the problem 
by looking at the two political factors simultaneously in models 4 and 8. These models 
disentangle the effects of partisanship (left vs. non-left) and government type (broad vs. 
narrow) by estimating the effects of all four combinations that can be formed from these two 
binary factors separately. Here we find a very clear pattern: left-wing broad coalition 
governments are associated with the strongest reduction in social spending in periods of fiscal 
consolidation. In contrast, adjustments under non-left narrow coalition governments may even 
lead to welfare state expansion (although this effect is not significant for large FA). The 
difference in the effect of fiscal adjustment between these two groups (i.e., difference in their 
coefficients) is highly significant (t-values in italics). The middle group for the effect of FA is 
constituted by left narrow coalition governments and non-left broad coalition governments. 
For the most part, these two middle groups do exhibit some significant welfare state 
retrenchment following the implementation of their austerity programs. These effects, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for each subgroup. However, the difference in coefficients between models 1-4 and 5-8 allows us to confidently 
state the reinforcing negative effect of large FA. 
16 The interaction term between FA and broad coalitions (model 3) misses the 90% significance level when 
Sweden, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain are excluded. For large FA (model 7), the coalition effect is 
not significant when Ireland is excluded from the sample. Likewise, the interaction term between large FA and 
left governments (model 6) is not significant when cabinets with 50% share of left parties also are 
operationalized as left governments. The direction of all these insignificant interaction effects remains as 
theoretically expected. 
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however, do not hold up well in all of the robustness tests. Moreover, we do not find 
consistent indications that the magnitude of these effects is significantly different from those 
found in the other groups.17  
Arguably partisan effects could differ by sectors of the welfare state, e.g. labour 
market policies versus pensions (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014). It is beyond the scope of this 
article to fully replicate our analyses on the basis of thoroughly disaggregated social 
expenditure data. As we show in the online appendix (Table A3), however, our findings are 
robust if we exclude spending on pensions and/or health care. 
We conclude that both the predominance of left parties in government and the 
presence of broad policy coalitions tend to foster welfare state retrenchment during austerity 
periods. These effects are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, if the adjustment program is large, 
this decisively strengthens the negative effect on the welfare state. Therefore, only the 
combination of all three factors—left-wing government, broad coalition, and large FA—leads 
to fiscal consolidations being associated with an unequivocal contraction in the trajectory of 
social expenditure growth, thus lending empirical support for our main hypothesis. 
6 Conclusion 
What are the conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to 
social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government 
condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? We argue 
that welfare state retrenchment is greatest when implemented by left-wing broad coalition 
governments, in particular in the context of large fiscal consolidations. 
                                                        
17 The volatility in the coefficient estimations for these two middle groups is demonstrated by the conservative 
test of excluding whole countries from the sample. For example, the coefficients from model 8 for left narrow 
governments vary between -1.81*** excluding Portugal to -0.68 (n.s.) excluding Belgium. Similarly, for non-left 
broad governments, the coefficients from model 8 vary between -0.53 (n.s.) excluding Ireland and -1.00** 
excluding Italy. 
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With regard to data and methods, this paper offers two innovations. First, it starts from 
policy programs as valid indicators of fiscal consolidation, and not from their outcomes of 
austerity measures. These outcomes may be confounded by many other variables and can 
therefore hardly be considered valid indicators of what we want to explain: how austerity 
programs are implemented and how they influence policy outcomes. Second,  by introducing 
various lags of our main independent variables in an autoregressive distributed lag design, we 
are able to calculate the long-run impact of fiscal adjustment programs on welfare state 
retrenchment. Most research relying on analysis of cross sectional time series start with rather 
restricted models and heroic assumptions about the temporal effects between a change in the 
independent and the dependent variables. Calculating the long run effects based on distributed 
lags—as we have done it in this article—may be a useful strategy to solve these problems, 
which are frequently ignored in standard TSCS analyses of fiscal adjustments and welfare 
state reform. 
In substantive terms, we offer an explanation, which is based on the combination of a 
partisan and a type of government argument. With regard to the partisan logic, we observe a 
‘Nixon goes to China’ scenario (Kitschelt, 2001). Left-wing governments tend to be 
significantly better able to target the welfare state than non-left governments are, which we 
essentially explain with their historical reputation as long-standing welfare state founders and 
defenders. With regard to the type of government, we find that broad pro-reform coalitions 
(surplus or minority governments) tend to be most likely to implement consolidations that 
trim the social safety net. This is due to the lower political and electoral risks, as well as, the 
higher time-consistency associated with policy-packages that are conceived and supported by 
broad pro-reform coalitions. 
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7 Tables 
Table 1: Occurrences of Fiscal Adjustment by Government Partisanship and Government 
Type 
  All FA cases Large FA only 
  FA No FA FA No FA 
Total (n=466) 159 (34%) 307 (66%) 37 (8%) 429 (92%) 
  
        Left Governments (n=133) 46 (35%) 87 (65%) 6 (5%) 127 (95%) 
Non-Left Governments (n=333) 113 (34%) 220 (66%) 31 (9%) 302 (91%) 
  
        Broad Coalitions (n=203) 56 (28%) 147 (72%) 18 (9%) 185 (91%) 
Narrow Coalitions (n=263) 103 (39%) 160 (61%) 19 (7%) 244 (93%) 
  
        Left & Broad Gov. (n=68) 20 (29%) 48 (71%) 3 (4%) 65 (96%) 
Left & Narrow Gov. (n=65) 26 (40%) 39 (60%) 3 (5%) 62 (95%) 
Non-Left & Broad Gov. (n=135) 36 (27%) 99 (73%) 15 (11%) 120 (89%) 
Non-Left & Narrow Gov. (n=198) 77 (39%) 121 (61%) 16 (8%) 182 (92%) 
 
Figure 1: Average long-run changes of social expenditure under FA and large FA 
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Table 2: Determinants of Changes (first differences) in Total Public Social Expenditures 
(ADL models with 3-year LRMs) 
  All FA Large FA 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t-1 
0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
FA [d] (LRM) 
-0.05 0.11 0.09 
 
-0.49** -0.37* 0.09 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.26) 
 
FA [d] * Left Government [d] (LRM)  
-0.59*** 
   
-1.17*** 
  
 
(0.19) 
   
(0.44) 
  
FA [d] * Broad Coalition [d] (LRM)   
-0.37* 
   
-1.00** 
 
  
(0.21) 
   
(0.45) 
 
FA, Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)    
-0.49** 
   
-1.62*** 
   
(0.25) 
   
(0.60) 
FA, Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)    
-0.19 
   
-0.98* 
 
2.58** 
(t-value) 
 
(0.18) 
 
2.75*** 
(t-value) 
 
(0.55) 
FA, Non-Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)   
-0.20 
  
-0.77** 
   
(0.22) 
   
(0.34) 
FA, Non-Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)    
0.20** 
   
0.14 
   
(0.10) 
   
(0.22) 
Broad Coalition [d] t 
-0.04 -0.05 
  
-0.04 -0.04 
  
(0.07) (0.07) 
  
(0.07) (0.07) 
  
Left Government [d] t 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
Public Social Expenditure  t-1 
-0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Growth t 
-0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Growth t-1 
0.04 0.04 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.05** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Δ Unemployment t 
0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.09*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Δ Unemployment t-1 
0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 0.10*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Δ Openness t 
-0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Elderly Population (% of total) t-1 
0.07** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Δ Social Security Contributions 
(% total tax revenue) t 
0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Party System Fractionalization t-1 
-0.01** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 
R2 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 
Entries are OLS coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country and year fixed 
effects and constant are not reported. Estimates for components of LRMs (i.e. lags of 'Left Government' or 'Broad Coalition' 
as well as contemporaneous and lagged versions of interaction terms) are not reported. 
* < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01 
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Online Appendix –Choosing the path of austerity 
Table A1: Variable Operationalization & Sources 
Total Public Social Expenditure 
Annual change rates (first differences), percentage of GDP. Level version (centered) included as control 
variable. 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (OECD 2012b) 
Fiscal Adjustment (FA) Episode 
All FA: Dummy = 1 whenever there was a FA program in a given country-year 
Large FA: Dummy = 1 when size of FA policy measures > 1.5% of GDP 
Source: Devries et al. (2011) 
Left Government Partisanship 
Dummy = 1 if > 50% of cabinet posts occupied by left parties. 
Source: Armingeon et al. (2014) 
Broad Policy Coalition 
Dummy = 1 when government is a surplus coalition, single or multi-party minority, or caretaker 
government; dummy = 0 for single-party majority governments or minimal winning coalitions. 
Source: Armingeon et al. (2014) 
Economic Growth 
Growth of real GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force. 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics. 
Openness 
Measured as total trade (sum of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP, at 2005 constant prices. 
Source: Penn World Table. 
Elderly Population 
Population 65 and over as a percentage of total population (centered). 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics. 
Social Contributions as Percentage of Taxes 
Social security contributions as a percentage of GDP divided by total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: OECD Tax Statistics. 
Party System Fractionalization 
Legislative (based on seat shares) fractionalization of the party system according to the Rae index (centered). 
Source: Armingeon et al. (2014). 
Table A2: Summary Statistics for all variables and observations used in the analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t 0.25 0.93 -2.40 5.10 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t-1 0.19 0.82 -2.40 5.10 
FA [d] 0.34 0.47 0 1 
FA Large [d] 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Left Government [d] t 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Broad Coalition [d] t 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Public Social Expenditure t-1 * 21.39 5.52 10.00 35.70 
GDP Growth t 2.43 2.43 -8.54 11.27 
GDP Growth t-1 2.63 2.06 -6.00 11.27 
Δ Unemployment t 0.03 1.16 -3.32 6.71 
Δ Unemployment t-1 0.00 1.08 -3.32 5.06 
Δ Openness t 0.58 4.62 -26.17 17.60 
Elderly Population (% of total) t-1 * 14.42 2.41 9.34 22.10 
Δ Social Security Contributions t 0.05 1.02 -4.61 4.29 
Party System Fractionalization t-1 * 67.97 10.94 40.91 88.98 
Notes: n = 466 (16 countries 1982-2009 plus Austria 1992-2009). 
* Variables centered for the empirical analysis 
 
  
Table A3: ADL models robustness checks 
  Model (A1) Model (A2) Model (A3) 
  Excluding control variables Excluding control variables 
Δ Social expenditure 
excluding old-age 
       
Independent Variables   All FA  Large FA  All FA  Large FA  All FA  Large FA 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t-1   
0.28*** 
  
0.23*** 
  
0.19*** 
  
0.17*** 
  
0.19*** 
  
0.19*** 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
FA, Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)   
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-1.49*** 
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(0.47) 
FA, Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.06 
 
-0.77 
 
-0.19 
 
-1.28** 
 
-0.29** 
 
-1.20** 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.54) 
FA, Non-Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.21 
 
-1.30*** 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.81** 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.73*** 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.25) 
FA, Non-Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
0.03 
 
0.22 
 
0.15 
 
-0.06 
 
0.23** 
 
0.25 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.10) 
  
(0.22) 
  
(0.09) 
  
(0.19) 
Public Social Expenditure  t-1         
-0.09*** 
  
-0.08*** 
  
-0.13*** 
  
-0.12*** 
        
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
GDP Growth t         
-0.20*** 
  
-0.21*** 
  
-0.11*** 
  
-0.11*** 
        
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
GDP Growth t-1         
0.05* 
  
0.05** 
  
0.04** 
  
0.05*** 
        
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
Δ Unemployment t         
0.05 
  
0.06* 
  
0.12*** 
  
0.12*** 
        
(0.04) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
Δ Unemployment t-1         
0.07 
  
0.09** 
  
0.06* 
  
0.08*** 
        
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
Δ Openness t               
-0.02*** 
  
-0.01** 
              
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
Elderly Population (% of total) t-1               
0.04* 
  
0.03* 
              
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
Δ Social Security Contributions 
(% total tax revenue) t 
              
0.07*** 
  
0.06*** 
              
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
Party System Fractionalization t-1               
-0.00 
  
-0.01* 
              
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
N 
  
466 
  
466 
  
466 
  
466 
  
466 
  
466 
R2 
  
0.54 
  
0.56 
  
0.67 
  
0.66 
  
0.61 
  
0.63 
 
  
Table A3 (continued): ADL models robustness checks 
  Model (A4) Model (A5) Model (A6) 
  
Δ Social expenditure 
excluding health 
Δ Social expend. excluding 
old-age and health No year dummies 
       
Independent Variables   All FA  Large FA  All FA  Large FA  All FA  Large FA 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t-1   
0.18***   0.17***   0.17***   0.16***   0.15***   0.13** 
  
(0.05)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
FA, Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)   
-0.46**   -1.53***   -0.51***   -1.38***   -0.38   -1.55*** 
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  (0.58) 
FA, Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.07  -0.85*  -0.18  -1.10**  -0.20  -0.96* 
 
(0.15)  (0.44)  (0.12)  (0.46)  (0.17)  (0.53) 
FA, Non-Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.05  -0.47  -0.11  -0.44**  -0.23  -0.74** 
 
(0.19)  (0.30)  (0.13)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
FA, Non-Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
0.18**  0.05  0.18***  0.15  0.16*  -0.10 
 
 
(0.08)   (0.19)   (0.07)   (0.17)   (0.09)   (0.22) 
Public Social Expenditure  t-1   
-0.11***   -0.10***   -0.13***   -0.12***   -0.11***   -0.09*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
GDP Growth t   
-0.14***   -0.14***   -0.07***   -0.07***   -0.20***   -0.21*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
GDP Growth t-1   
0.03   0.03   0.03*   0.03**   0.05**   0.06*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Δ Unemployment t   
0.09***   0.10***   0.12***   0.13***   0.11***   0.12*** 
  
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Δ Unemployment t-1   
0.08**   0.09***   0.06**   0.08***   0.03   0.06 
  
(0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Δ Openness t   
-0.02***   -0.02***   -0.01**   -0.01**   -0.03***   -0.03*** 
  
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Elderly Population (% of total) t-1   
0.09***   0.09***   0.05***   0.05***   0.09***   0.07*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Δ Social Security Contributions 
(% total tax revenue) t 
  
0.04**   0.04*   0.02   0.01   0.11***   0.10*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Party System Fractionalization t-1   
-0.01   -0.01**   -0.00   -0.01*   -0.01   -0.01 
  
(0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
N 
  
466   466   466   466   466   466 
R2 
  
0.67   0.68   0.57   0.58   0.62   0.64 
 
Table A3 (continued): ADL models robustness checks 
  Model (A7) Model (A8) 
  
Δ Social expenditure as a 
percentage of total public 
expenditure 
Using Manifesto Project 
data for left governments 
     
Independent Variables   All FA  Large FA  All FA  Large FA 
Δ Public Social Expenditure  t-1   
0.11**   0.08*   0.19***   0.20*** 
  
(0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
FA, Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)   
-0.50**   -1.67***   -0.52***   -1.29*** 
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 (0.49) 
FA, Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.19  -1.34**  0.26*  -0.23 
 
(0.24)  (0.56)  (0.15)  (0.48) 
FA, Non-Left, Broad Gov. [d] (LRM)  
-0.21  -1.01***  -0.16  -0.72* 
 
(0.24)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.39) 
FA, Non-Left, Narrow Gov. [d] (LRM)  
0.16  -0.02  -0.01  0.14 
 
 
(0.12)   (0.25)   (0.11)   (0.24) 
Public Social Expenditure  t-1   
-0.13***   -0.11***   -0.11***   -0.10*** 
  
(0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
GDP Growth t   
-0.20***   -0.21***   -0.18***   -0.18*** 
  
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
GDP Growth t-1   
0.04   0.04   0.04   0.03 
  
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Δ Unemployment t   
0.08*   0.09**   0.07**   0.08** 
  
(0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.03) 
Δ Unemployment t-1   
0.11**   0.13***   0.08**   0.08** 
  
(0.05)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Δ Openness t   
-0.03***   -0.03***   -0.02***   -0.02*** 
  
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Elderly Population (% of total) t-1   
0.07*   0.05*   0.08**   0.06** 
  
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03) 
Δ Social Security Contributions 
(% total tax revenue) t 
  
0.09***   0.08***   0.09***   0.08*** 
  
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Party System Fractionalization t-1   
-0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01* 
  
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Δ Non-social expenditure   
-1.00***   -1.01***       
  
(0.03)   (0.03)       
Δ Non-social expenditure t-1   
0.16***   0.13**       
  
(0.06)   (0.06)       
Δ Non-social expenditure t-2   
-0.02   -0.01       
  
(0.02)   (0.03)       
N 
  
449   449   466   466 
R2 
  
0.80   0.81   0.69   0.70 
 
Note: All robustness tests based on Model 4 (All FA) and Model 8 (Large FA). Entries are OLS coefficients with panel-
corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country and year fixed effects and constant are not reported. 
Estimates for components of LRMs (i.e. lags of 'Left Government' or 'Broad Coalition' as well as contemporaneous and 
lagged versions of interaction terms) are not reported. 
* < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01 
  
Figure A1: Predicted changes in social expenditure for left/broad and non-left/narrow 
governments 
 
 
Note: Lines represent ‘impulse response functions’, i.e. the response of Yt to an impulse shock in Xt (De Boef 
and Keele 2008), calculated on the basis of Models 4 and 8. Social expenditure change measured in percentage 
of GDP. 
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Methodological concerns: Robustness tests and endogeneity  
We ran additional robustness tests for our analyses (regression estimates available upon 
request). First, our findings are robust to alternative operational definitions, such as 
continuous variables instead of dummies for the FA variables, the modification of the 
threshold constructing the dummy for left governments, using a continuous partisanship 
variable in separate models or using data from the Manifesto Project1, and an alternative 
coalition measure, where broad coalitions are minority or multi-party governments with a 
certain threshold of parliamentary support (see section 3). Second, our findings are robust 
against including a number of additional controls, such as institutional variables for 
federalism and bicameralism, and a dummy variable for Eurozone membership, as well as 
excluding controls (see models A1 and A2 in Table A3). Third, our main result suggested by 
models 4 and 8—essentially an identification of those combinations of government type and 
partisan complexion that are most conducive or obstructive to welfare-state-driven fiscal 
adjustment—is robust to the exclusion of any of the 17 countries in the data set.2 
A final issue concerns the possibility of endogeneity in our explanation. It could be the 
case, that both left-wing governments and broad policy coalitions exhibit a higher propensity 
for large fiscal adjustments to begin with, which is in turn correlated with a greater reliance 
on social spending cuts. Although recent research points to such complex influences of 
political factors on fiscal adjustment programs (AUTHORS, 2014; Hübscher, 2015; Hübscher 
& Sattler, 2014), we need to differentiate between the decision to consolidate on the one hand, 
and the size of that consolidation on the other. Using Tobit models, Hübscher (2015) 
                                                        
1 Source: Volkens et al. (2014). We calculated governments’ annual left-right scores from the Manifesto Project 
dataset following the procedure laid out by Seki and Williams (2014) based on their update of the Party 
Government data set by Woldendorp et al. (2000). We then created the group dummies from our Models 4 and 8 
(left/broad etc.) using the sample median of the manifesto left-right score as a cutoff for our left dummy. In these 
models, the group differences between left/broad and non-left/narrow remain significant (t=-2.31 for all FA, t=-
2.64 for FA large). 
2 Excluding Spain leads to a result where the coefficient in model 4 for FA under left broad governments misses 
significance (p=0.31). Consequently, the difference of this group to the effect by non-left narrow governments is 
significant at the 87%-level only. Given that these are two-sided tests of significance, we do not consider this 
finding to be too critical, though. When looking at large FA cases only in model 8, both estimates remain 
statistically significant at the 90%-level even when Spain is excluded.  
essentially assumes that there is a uniform process influencing both the likelihood of fiscal 
adjustments and its size in the same direction (see Smith & Brame, 2003). In an earlier 
publication on precisely that question, however, we found that likelihood and size might be 
detrimental: right-wing narrow coalitions have a higher likelihood to consolidate, yet their 
adjustment programs are likely to be of smaller size (AUTHORS, 2014). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether this really indicates an endogeneity issue with regard to the reliance of 
adjustments on welfare state spending. 
Having said this, our tests show that neither the likelihood nor the sizes of FA under 
left-wing broad coalition governments are significantly different from the likelihood or size of 
the other three groups. More specifically, we apply two-sided t-tests comparing the mean 
likelihood of FA, as well as the mean size of FA, under each of the four types of government 
against the average of the three remaining governments. The results are shown in Table A4. 
For the group of left, broad coalition governments, the mean differences to the other 
governments are not statistically different from zero (p>0.20). We also test likelihood and size 
against each other group on its own (thus always excluding two groups). Here the only 
significant difference concerning left broad governments is that their adjustments are smaller 
in size than those of non-left broad governments (p=0.02). However, considering only large 
FA, this size difference is insignificant (p=0.67). Since—in contrast to non-left narrow 
governments—non-left broad governments are not the main group of reference to which we 
test and compare the effects of FA on social expenditure, we conclude that there are no 
systematic differences in the likelihood and size of FA among our types of governments that 
are endogenous to our main causal mechanisms. Moreover, the restrictive nature of our 
robustness tests, such as excluding whole country series from the sample, gives no rise to 
serious endogeneity concerns. 
 
 Table A4: Comparing likelihood and size of FA under left/broad governments to other 
groups (two-sided t-tests) 
 All FA Large FA 
Comparison Probability of FA Size of FA if FA=1 Probability of FA Size of FA if FA=1 
Left/broad 0.29 (N=68) 0.76 (N=20) 0.04 (N=68) 2.37 (N=3) 
Left/narrow + 
non-left/broad + 
non-left/narrow 
0.35 (N=398) 1.05 (N=139) 0.09 (N=398) 2.37 (N=34) 
Difference 0.06 (p=0.38) 0.28 (p=0.22) 0.04 (p=0.25) 0.00 (p=1.00) 
Left/broad 0.29 (N=68) 0.76 (N=20) 0.04 (N=68) 2.37 (N=3) 
Left/narrow 0.40 (N=65) 0.89 (N=26) 0.05 (N=65) 1.78 (N=3) 
Difference 0.11 (p=0.20) 0.13 (p=0.55) 0.00 (p=0.96) -0.59 (p=0.37) 
Left/broad 0.29 (N=68) 0.76 (N=20) 0.04 (N=68) 2.37 (N=3) 
Non-left/broad 0.27 (N=135) 1.52 (N=36) 0.11 (N=135) 2.67 (N=15) 
Difference -0.03 (p=0.68) 0.75** (p=0.02) 0.07 (p=0.11) 0.30 (p=0.67) 
Left/broad 0.29 (N=68) 0.76 (N=20) 0.04 (N=68) 2.37 (N=3) 
Non-left/narrow 0.39 (N=198) 0.88 (N=77) 0.08 (N=198) 2.20 (N=16) 
Difference 0.09 (p=0.16) 0.11 (p=0.60) 0.04 (p=0.31) -0.16 (p=0.73) 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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